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UNITED STATES v. BRYANT: THE RESULTS OF
UPHOLDING WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Madalynn Martin*
Introduction
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a known women’s advocate, authored a
unanimous opinion that ensured the rights and dignity of Indian women
were upheld.1 United States v. Bryant, while primarily focused on the rights
of Indian women, is equally as important in upholding the sovereignty of
tribal courts. The Supreme Court held that, because tribal court convictions
are valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), federal courts can use
previous tribal court convictions to enhance the sentencing of the defendant
as a repeat offender.2 In tribal courts, there is no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Rather, most tribal courts are governed by ICRA which offers
similar guarantees. The provision of ICRA regarding the right to counsel
differs from the Sixth Amendment on when indigent defendants are offered
counsel. Thus, several tribal court convictions would be invalid in state or
federal court because the indigent defendant was not given defense counsel
pursuant to constitutional standards. These uncounseled tribal court
convictions are then used in federal court to convict Indian defendants as
habitual offenders. In this case, although the defendant’s previous tribal
court domestic violence conviction would have violated the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel provision in a federal or state court, it was a
valid conviction under ICRA and was able to be used to convict the
defendant as a domestic violence habitual offender.3 The Court’s decision
upheld the rights of Indian women and tribal sovereignty, and showcased
the difference in the right to counsel granted to Indian indigent tribal court
defendants.
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Bryant and offer examples of various applications by both federal and state
courts. Additionally, this Note will discuss the difficulties faced by tribal
courts seeking to maintain autonomy over crimes committed in Indian
*
1.
2.
3.

Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 1958–59.
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Country and the additional protections put in place for Indian women
experiencing domestic violence. Part I will address the relevant law
applicable to United States v. Bryant at the time of the decision. Part II will
discuss the procedural history of Bryant in the Ninth Circuit, as well as the
circuit split it created with the Eighth and Tenth Circuit. Part III will delve
into the Supreme Court’s decision and Justice Thomas’ concurrence. Part
IV will highlight the differing applications of the Bryant decision in federal
and state court decisions. Part V will discuss the implications of this
decision, including reasons why tribal courts defer to federal courts and
what other protections are in place for Indian women in tribal courts.
I. Relevant Law
A. Right to Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment states that criminal defendants “have the [right to]
Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence.”4 Specifically, the Sixth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
anytime a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.5 The right to have counsel
appointed for indigent defendants was not a requirement for states to
provide until 1963, when the right to appointed counsel was held to be
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial” in Gideon v. Wainwright.6 The
right to counsel attaches at any “critical stage” of the criminal proceeding,
which in federal court means the right attaches at a defendant’s
arraignment.7 Further, in 1972, the Supreme Court specified that the right to
counsel must be afforded to any indigent defendant charged with any
offense that is punishable by a term of imprisonment.8 Thus, states must
provide indigent defendants with counsel if they are being tried for a crime
that includes the possibility of incarceration.
Because the U.S. legal system is based upon the policy that everyone is
innocent until proven guilty, this Sixth Amendment mandate ensures
defendants who cannot afford counsel are still given a fair shot at
maintaining that innocence.9 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
stated that even a smart man “[w]ithout [the assistance of counsel], though
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
6. Id. at 342.
7. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).
8. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
9. Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 381.
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he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.”10 This case reflects the view of a
majority of Americans today who believe that “the quality of justice a
person receives should not be determined by how much money he or she
has.”11 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel remains a fundamental rule
in our criminal justice system since its establishment in Gideon v.
Wainwright.
Although providing indigent defendants the assistance of counsel is
required by the U.S. Constitution and is a driving ideal in America today,
the logistics of providing defendants with this service has its challenges.
Immediately after the Supreme Court decision to require states to provide
counsel to indigent defendants, states struggled to implement this mandate
and it has continued to create more issues within the criminal justice
system.12 Specifically, government funding for public defenders is
shockingly low, and any attempts to increase funding are often met with
political resistance.13 These public defenders are also required to handle
more cases than an effective assistance claim would allow.14 A 2017 study
showed public defenders in Rhode Island should handle only about thirtysix percent of their current caseload to provide reasonably effective
assistance of counsel.15 More than fifty years after the monumental Gideon
v. Wainwright decision requiring states to provide counsel for indigent
defendants, the government still struggles to find the funding to guarantee a
fair trial under this constitutional mandate.
B. The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act and the 2010 Tribal Law and Order
Act
While the United States Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, this constitutional ideal is not
encompassed in tribal laws. In 1896, the Supreme Court held that tribal
governments were not bound by the limitations of the U.S. Constitution.16
The Court pointed out that “the Indian nations ha[ve] always been
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
11. Baxter, supra note 9.
12. Id. at 348.
13. Robert E. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent Defense, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
25, 53–54 (2015).
14. Baxter, supra note 9, at 355–57.
15. ABA & NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE RHODE ISLAND PROJECT: A
STUDY OF THE RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD
STANDARDS 7 (2017).
16. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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considered as distinct, independent political communities . . . .”17
Additionally, the Constitution specifically states treaties already made with
tribes are the “supreme law of the land.”18 In response to this holding, the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was fashioned in 1968 to give citizens
under tribal jurisdiction the same or similar rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution.19 Thus, unlike federal or state
courts, tribal courts are constrained by ICRA and not the U.S.
Constitution.20 ICRA received mixed reviews from tribes.21 While some
tribes have incorporated ICRA entirely into their tribal constitutions, ICRA
has not been transferred into many tribal constitutions, and others have
chosen to adapt ICRA provisions through the tribe’s own cultural lens.22
The reason ICRA has not been fully implemented is because ICRA is seen
by some as an attack on traditional culture and meant to force tribes to
assimilate to western legal norms.23
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Tribal Law and Order Act
(TLOA), which amended ICRA and reformed the tribal criminal justice
system.24 The purpose of TLOA was “to clarify governmental
responsibilities regarding crimes in Indian Country; increase and improve
collaboration among jurisdictions; support tribal self-governance and
jurisdiction; . . . [and] combat crimes such as domestic violence [and]
sexual assault . . . .”25 Under TLOA, tribal courts now have the ability to
impose felony-level offenses, which include “sentences of up to three years
per count and up to nine years per case . . . .”26 Before TLOA, tribal courts
could only sentence defendants up to one year imprisonment.27 Like ICRA,
many tribes have yet to incorporate TLOA into their criminal codes.28 In a
17. Id. at 383 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
18. Id.
19. Casey Douma, 40th Anniversary of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Finding a Way Back
to Indigenous Justice, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 34, 34.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 34.
24. Christopher B. Chaney, The Promise of the Tribal Law and Order Act, FED. LAW.,
Mar./Apr. 2011, at 44, 44.
25. MICHELLE RIVARD PARKS, TRIBAL JUDICIAL INST., TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT:
ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY 2 (2015).
26. Chaney, supra note 24, at 46.
27. Id.
28. See Seth J. Fortin, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and Order Act, 61
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 88, 94 (2013).
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2012 report on TLOA, only sixty-four percent of selected tribes
implemented about half the provisions necessary for enhanced sentencing
and had trouble implementing the rest.29 Thus, for many tribes, the earlier
ICRA provisions are still governing law.
At first glance, it appears the provisions of ICRA and the Bill of Rights
are coextensive, but several provisions, including the right to counsel, are
slightly different. The ICRA provision regarding the right to counsel states
that in “a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe . . . imposes a total
term of imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian tribe
shall . . . at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent
defendant the assistance of a defense attorney . . . .”30 Even though ICRA is
recognized as a similar, modified version of the Bill of Rights, there is no
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in tribal court if the
sentence imposed is less than one year.31 Thus, the ICRA provision about
the right to counsel is not equivalent to the Sixth Amendment right because
the Court has interpreted the constitutional right to attach anytime a
sentence of imprisonment could be imposed.
C. Domestic Assault Habitual Offender Statute
In United States v. Bryant, the defendant was charged in federal court
with being a domestic assault habitual offender.32 Habitual offenders, or
those who have been previously charged with domestic assault, are given
harsher punishment than first- or second-time offenses in an attempt to
combat recidivism for sexual offenders.33 The domestic assault habitual
offender statute, referred to as § 117(a), includes
[a]ny person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian
country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate
prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court
proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal
jurisdiction[,]
. . . assault . . . against a spouse or intimate partner . . . .34
The punishment for a domestic assault habitual offender is a sentence of
imprisonment for up to five years unless the domestic assault includes
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 99.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).
Id.
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2018).
Id.
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substantial bodily injury, then the offender is potentially subject to a tenyear sentence.35 This statute was created by the passage of the 2005
Violence Against Women Act targeting serial domestic abuse offenders
because of a statistically high recidivism rate among domestic abusers.36 In
the creation of this habitual offender statute, lawmakers specifically
included the ability to use Indian tribal court proceedings for the predicate
offense.37 Before this domestic assault habitual offender statute, abusers in
Indian Country could not be tried in federal court unless the abuse resulted
in serious bodily injury or death.38 Additionally, tribal courts could not
punish repeat abusers to sentences above one-year incarceration prior to the
enactment of the 2010 TLOA.39 A one year sentence is considered
“insufficient to deter repeated and escalating abuse.”40 Although advanced
punishment is now available for tribes under TLOA, many have yet to
adopt TLOA and still rely on the Federal Government and § 117(a) to
convict defendants with a lengthier sentence.41
D. Enhanced Sentencing and Invalid Prior Convictions
The use of prior convictions to enhance sentencing raised concerns;
specifically, whether the prior convictions used are valid and whether the
defendant is being punished for the prior convictions. In Burgett v. Texas,
the Supreme Court held when a prior conviction is obtained in violation of
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, that conviction cannot be used to
support guilt or enhance punishment for a later offense.42 The use of the
prior conviction would only create “anew” a Sixth Amendment violation in
any subsequent convictions of the defendant.43 Thus, any invalid conviction
cannot be used to punish habitual offenders. Additionally, in Nichols v.
United States, the Supreme Court specified that a sentence enhancement
due to a prior conviction is not punishment for the prior conviction, but it is
a punishment only for the current conviction being charged.44 In Nichols,
the defendant’s guilty plea to a DUI offense was used to enhance his
35. Id.
36. NAT’L CONG. OF AMERICAN INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 15 n.xiv (2018).
37. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Fortin, supra note 28, at 90–91.
42. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
43. Id.
44. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
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sentencing for a later offense.45 Because the DUI offense was a
misdemeanor subject to a fine—and not a term of imprisonment—the
defendant did not have a constitutional right to counsel for that trial.46
While this conviction was uncounseled, the conviction was not obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.47 Accordingly, the Court held that the
uncounseled prior conviction may be used to enhance sentencing.48 Using
valid previous convictions to enhance punishment in sentencing is not
punishment for past convictions.49 Indeed, “100% of the punishment is for
the offense of the conviction. None is for the prior convictions or the
defendant's ‘status as a recidivist.’”50 Thus, a valid prior conviction,
whether counseled or not, is necessary to enhance sentencing for the current
offense.51
E. Doctrine of Comity
To be able to use tribal court convictions, courts refer to the doctrine of
comity. Comity “is a balancing act between recognizing the legislative,
executive and judicial acts of other nations and the rights of citizens of the
recognizing countries.”52 It is “based on the notion of respect for the ability
of another nation to govern its own affairs and to regulate events there.”53
For Indian tribes, comity “has been chiefly concerned with ensuring tribal
court remedies are exhausted before federal courts become involved.”54
Further, the doctrine of comity reasons that courts should “as a matter of
discretion rather than obligation defer to the assertion of jurisdiction or give
effect to the judgments of other states or sovereigns out of mutual respect,
and for the purpose of furthering the orderly administration of justice.”55
Comity is also concerned with prior tribal court convictions since tribes are
45. Id. at 740.
46. Id. at 743 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)).
47. Id. at 746.
48. Id. at 746–47.
49. Id. at 747.
50. United States v. Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008).
51. Id.
52. Samuel D. Newton, Note, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The
Constitutionality of Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal
Trials After Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489, 501 (2011–2012).
53. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.07(2)(a) (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2017).
54. Newton, supra note 52.
55. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 236 Wis.
2d 384, 405 (2000).
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considered separate sovereigns.56 Respecting and recognizing tribal court
convictions helps prevent “endless relitigation of issues.”57 The doctrine of
comity allows for courts to have deferential preference toward recognizing
prior tribal court convictions when relying on them in subsequent
proceedings.
II. Procedural and Factual History
The facts in United States v. Bryant exemplify the problem of domestic
violence in Indian Country. Michael Bryant Jr. is an enrolled member of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe and once resided on the reservation.58 During that
time, Mr. Bryant had a record of over one hundred tribal court convictions,
and at least five of those convictions were guilty pleas for domestic abuse.59
For each of his domestic violence cases, the tribal court sentenced Mr.
Bryant to terms of imprisonment of less than one year.60 Under ICRA, the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court was not required to appoint Mr. Bryant
counsel during his domestic violence convictions because the terms of
imprisonment were less than one year.61 In 2011, Mr. Bryant was once
again arrested within tribal jurisdiction for assaulting two different
women.62
This time, Mr. Bryant’s case was not brought to tribal court, but instead
to federal district court where he was indicted by a grand jury as a domestic
assault habitual offender under § 117(a).63 The court used Mr. Bryant’s five
previous tribal court domestic violence convictions to charge him under §
117(a).64 Finally receiving assistance of counsel, Mr. Bryant motioned the
court to dismiss the habitual offender charge.65 He argued that using the
tribal court convictions as a predicate offense violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because his uncounseled tribal court
convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if
brought in state or federal court.66 The trial court denied the motion to
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Newton, supra note 52.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 53, § 7.07(2)(a).
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1963–64.
Id.
Id. at 1964.
Id.
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dismiss the habitual offender charge, and Mr. Bryant consequently pleaded
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the issue.67 Mr. Bryant was then
sentenced as a habitual offender, and, with the help of counsel, appealed the
district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss to the Ninth Circuit.68
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
relying on its previous decision in United States v. Ant.69 In Ant, the
defendant wanted to suppress a prior guilty plea made in tribal court arising
out of the same offense in federal court.70 The court focused on the
reliability of the previous tribal court conviction.71 In Ant, the court decided
the lack of assistance of counsel made the previous guilty plea unreliable to
be used in federal courts.72 Using the precedent from Ant, the Ninth Circuit
found the admissibility of the tribal court convictions valid only if Mr.
Bryant was guaranteed the right to counsel coextensive with the Sixth
Amendment.73 The court reasoned that Mr. Bryant’s prior convictions, if
obtained in federal or state court, would have violated the Sixth
Amendment because he was not offered counsel.74 As such, the Ninth
Circuit held the government may not rely on Mr. Bryant’s tribal court
convictions to charge him as a habitual offender because the convictions,
while valid under ICRA, violate the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.75 This decision created a circuit split between the Ninth
Circuit and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cavanaugh was “persuaded . . .
that the predicate convictions, valid at their inception, and not alleged to be
otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements of § 117.”76 In this
case, the defendant was charged in federal court with domestic violence by
a habitual offender under § 117(a).77 The defendant’s prior convictions in
tribal court were without the assistance of counsel and would have been in
violation of the Sixth Amendment had they been in state or federal court
because they resulted in incarceration.78 The district court had dismissed the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1989).
Newton, supra note 52, at 519.
Ant, 882 F.2d at 1395.
Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
Id. at 673.
Id.
643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593–94.
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habitual offender claims below because, although the tribal court
convictions were valid, they would “give rise anew to a Sixth Amendment
violation by imposing federal punishment.”79 The Eighth Circuit reversed
the lower court’s holding.80 The appellate court reasoned that the use of the
uncounseled tribal court conviction did not violate any Sixth Amendment
guarantees because the punishment imposed in the current case is for the
current offense only, not for the prior conviction.81 When contemplating
whether the tribal court conviction was able to be used the Eighth Circuit
noted that if it did make the decision to not uphold the validity of the tribal
court conviction, this decision would not “restrict a tribe’s own use of that
conviction; it would simply restrict a federal court’s ability to impose
additional punishment at a later date in reliance on that earlier
conviction.”82 Because the Sixth Amendment is not extended to tribal
courts, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s conviction was
able to be used in subsequent federal proceedings.83 The court further
buttressed this opinion by citing the doctrine of comity, acknowledging that
deference must be given to the tribal court conviction out of respect for the
sovereignty of tribal courts.84
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Shavanaux upheld the use of the
defendant’s prior uncounseled tribal court conviction in his federal court
conviction to classify him as a domestic assault habitual offender under §
117(a).85 The court concluded that the defendant’s tribal court conviction
was not—and could not—be a violation of the Sixth Amendment because
the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal jurisdiction.86 Moreover, a valid
conviction cannot violate “anew” the Sixth Amendment in subsequent
federal court proceedings.87 “[T]he practice of failing to fully recognize
convictions from individual tribal courts also risks imposing inappropriately
sweeping standards upon diverse tribal governments, institutions and
cultures,” which undermines ICRA's objective of allowing tribes to adopt
“their own tribal court[s] and criminal justice system[s].”88 Further, the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 595.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 605.
647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1000 (citation omitted).
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Tenth Circuit reasoned that upholding tribal convictions is similar to
upholding the validity of using prior foreign offenses that do not comport
with the Constitution.89 Under the principle of comity, the Tenth Circuit
allowed the use of tribal court convictions in federal district court to
enhance sentencing.90
Both the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit based their holdings in
Cavanaugh and Shavanaux on the notion that, because the convictions were
brought in tribal court, and the Sixth Amendment does not apply, the
convictions are valid if properly conducted under ICRA.91 Alternatively, the
Ninth Circuit based its holding on the fact that the conviction would have
been unconstitutional if brought in federal court and thus raised reliability
issues.92 While there are Sixth Amendment concerns of reliability in
Bryant, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, and instead
chose to apply the Eighth and Tenth Circuit’s comity approach to prior
tribal court convictions.93
III. United States v. Bryant
A. Issue and Holding
The Ninth Circuit decision was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court
to answer the question: “Is it permissible to use uncounseled tribal-court
convictions—obtained in full compliance with ICRA—to establish the
prior-crimes predicate of § 117(a)?”94 The Court held that it was
permissible to use the defendant’s uncounseled tribal court convictions as a
predicate offense for an enhanced sentence because these convictions did
not violate ICRA or the Sixth Amendment.95
B. Reasoning
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion starts by emphasizing the importance of this
case for Native American women because, “compared to all other groups in
the United States,” Native American women “experience the highest rates

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1001.
91. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
92. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014).
93. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1964 (2016).
94. Id. at 1962.
95. Id. at 1958–59.
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of domestic violence.”96 Specifically, § 117(a), the punishment provision
for domestic violence habitual offenders, is important for Native American
women because it helps deter and prevent recidivism of abusers in Indian
Country.97 The facts in United States v. Bryant exemplify § 117(a)’s
solution for recidivism because the defendant was brought into federal court
as a habitual offender after multiple convictions for domestic assault in
tribal court.98
The Court relied on Nichols v. United States in its analysis and
decision.99 The precedent set in Nichols provides that a valid conviction in
any court can be used as a predicate offense for § 117(a).100 The defendant,
Mr. Bryant, unsuccessfully argued that his case is distinctive from the
defendant in Nichols v. United States, because he was actually imprisoned
for his uncounseled tribal court convictions, unlike the defendant in Nichols
who received a fine.101 Under this argument, the tribal court conviction
would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment if Mr. Bryant had been tried
and convicted in state or federal court and, thus, it creates “anew” a Sixth
Amendment violation in federal courts.102 Mr. Bryant conceded that all of
his previous tribal court convictions were valid under ICRA, but still
maintained that they could not be used as a predicate offense under §
117(a).103 The Court held the uncounseled tribal court conviction could be
used regardless of whether the previous conviction would violate the rules
of the present court.104 Pursuant to the conclusion in Nichols that repeat
offender laws do not punish the previous crime, the previous conviction
need only be a valid state, federal, or tribal conviction to be used under §
117(a).105
The Court further relied on the doctrine of comity when discussing the
reliability of tribal court convictions governed by ICRA.106 Although lack
of counsel when subject to a term of imprisonment would violate the Sixth
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal courts.107
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1959 (quoting 151st CONG. REC. 9061 (2005) (remarks of Sen. McCain)).
Id. at 1960.
Id.
Id. at 1963.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1962.
Id. at 1964.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1966.
Id. at 1964.
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Rather, ICRA is the governing law to control the validity of the tribal court
conviction. As such, the holding in Burgett, that using a prior conviction
that violates the Sixth Amendment would create “anew” another Sixth
Amendment violation, is not applicable to Mr. Bryant because there was no
initial violation.108 Accordingly, the tribal court predicate offense cannot
create “anew” a Sixth Amendment violation if the prior conviction is
governed by ICRA and not the Sixth Amendment.109 Additionally, the
Court acknowledged there is no reason to suppose that tribal court
convictions are less reliable or cannot be used as a predicate offense in
federal court if they result in imprisonment rather than a fine.110
In addition to the Sixth Amendment claim, Mr. Bryant invoked a Fifth
Amendment due process claim.111 The due process claim was an attempt to
preclude using any tribal court conviction as a predicate offense in federal
court because using that conviction does not afford the same due process of
law that the Constitution requires.112 This argument was rejected by the
Court because ICRA guarantees defendants due process of law, even if the
ICRA provision is different than the corresponding constitutional
guarantee.113 The Court supported this by reasoning that ICRA additionally
provides procedural safeguards by allowing defendants to appeal the
decisions of the tribal court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, which
offers the defendant adequate due process of the law.114
C. Justice Thomas’ Concurrence
Justice Thomas joined the majority only because precedent cases dictate
this holding.115 But, Justice Thomas disagreed with the decision of the
Court to uphold the use of the tribal court conviction as a prior offense in a
subsequent trial, because he saw no constitutional backing for the previous
decisions that gave rise to the current decision.116 Justice Thomas outlined
the three premises upon which this holding relied.117 First, the holding
relied on the fact that the Sixth Amendment restricts any use of prior
convictions that are invalid because they were not obtained pursuant to the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id. at 1965.
Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1967 (Thomas, concurring).
Id.
Id.
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Sixth Amendment.118 Second, the holding also was grounded on the fact
that tribes are sovereign and are not bound to the terms of the U.S.
Constitution.119 Third, the holding also focused on Congress’s power to
“punish assaults that tribal members commit against each other on Indian
land.”120
Regarding the first premise, Justice Thomas asked the Court to
reconsider Burgett’s bar on using convictions in violation of the Sixth
Amendment for predicate offenses because they would give rise “anew” to
a Sixth Amendment violation in the current case.121 To Justice Thomas, the
text of the Sixth Amendment should only guarantee the right to assistance
of counsel for the current proceeding and thus, be able to use invalid prior
convictions as predicate offenses.122 For the second and third premise,
Justice Thomas commented on the contradiction that tribes are not
constrained to follow the Constitution because they are sovereign, but Mr.
Bryant is able to be federally prosecuted for a crime that should only be
able to be brought in tribal court because Congress is endowed with “power
over all aspects of tribal sovereignty.”123 Thus, even though tribes are
allowed to set up their court systems without regard for the enumerated
constitutional provisions, Congress can limit and “second guess” the ability
of the tribal courts, and choose to punish certain Indian crimes in federal
court.124 Justice Thomas “continue[s] to doubt” whether complete tribal
sovereignty or Congress’ dominion over tribal court is the correct way to
view tribal sovereignty, and acknowledges that the U.S. Constitution does
not give any guidance to the issue.125
IV. Applications
Because tribal court convictions can apply beyond tribal jurisdiction,
there are further implications from the holding in Bryant than main issue of
Indian indigent defendants not being afforded the right to counsel. As such,
it is helpful to review how different courts have applied Bryant in an array
of circumstances. As the following cases will show, Bryant has been used
to uphold the application of several tribal convictions beyond tribal
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1968.
Id.
Id.
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jurisdiction. For example, the holding from Bryant was applied to a
defendant who plead guilty to child molestation in tribal court without
counsel and failed to register as a sex offender outside of tribal
jurisdiction.126 Additionally, it has been upheld where the defendant was
given the assistance of lay counsel instead of a licensed attorney.127 Further,
Bryant has been applied where the defendant invoked a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in tribal jurisdiction, but it did not attach until the case was
brought for arraignment in federal court.128 Finally, Bryant has been applied
to a decision where the defendant claimed his Fifth Amendment due
process right was violated at the prior tribal court conviction.129
A. Sex Offender Registration
A similar application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant is the
Arizona Court of Appeals decision in State v. Lopez.130 In this case, the
defendant pleaded guilty—without the assistance of counsel—in tribal court
to child molestation and was sentenced to less than a year imprisonment. 131
Thus, this was a valid tribal court conviction under ICRA. After the
defendant’s release, he was charged by the state for failing to register as a
sex offender.132 The defendant then challenged this claim as
unconstitutional because it was based on an uncounseled tribal court
conviction.133 Initially, the state court could not use the uncounseled tribal
court conviction because the court was subject to the Ninth Circuit’s
original holding in United States v. Bryant.134 When the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bryant, the Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed its decision.135 The Arizona Court of Appeals held the
tribal court conviction can show failure to register as long as the provisions
of ICRA were followed in the prior conviction.136
Bryant’s application in State v. Lopez is a primary example of how the
decision in Bryant can harm a defendant that might not realize the full
126. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
127. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
128. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
129. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
130. Nos. 2 CA-CR 2016-0076 and 2 CA-CR 2016-0122, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1097 (Ct. App. July 27, 2017).
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *6.
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effect of his uncounseled guilty plea outside of tribal jurisdiction. In this
case, the defendant was not offered assistance of counsel in tribal court, but
he would have been offered that assistance if the case was brought in state
or federal court. The defendant was not offered the same rights as those
given in the jurisdiction that the conviction was then applied. While the
Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of comity necessitates this result,
there are consequences to indigent tribal defendants who are not offered the
same rights as defendants in state or federal court.
B. Assistance of Lay Counsel
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant was applied in reference to a
defendant’s claim that he had not been given proper assistance of counsel in
tribal court. In United States v. Long, the defendant was charged in federal
court with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, which
requires a finding of a predicate offense.137 The predicate offense used was
the defendant’s previous Rosebud tribal court conviction, which resulted in
sentencing more than a year of incarceration.138 According to ICRA, the
defendant was given right to counsel in the tribal court because he was
indigent and his sentencing was for a period greater than a year.139 The
Eighth Circuit reasoned “any right that Long had to appointed counsel
could have come only from Rosebud tribal law.”140 Under Rosebud tribal
law, lay counsel, instead of licensed attorneys, can be chosen to represent
indigent defendants.141 Rosebud tribal court did not appoint an attorney to
represent the defendant; rather, he was appointed a lay person to represent
him in his tribal court case.142 Because Bryant affirmed that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to tribal courts, as long as the prior conviction
was valid under Rosebud tribal law, it was also valid to use as a predicate
offense.143
There are no provisions under ICRA requiring that the counsel chosen to
represent the indigent defendant be effective or a licensed attorney.144 Many
tribal courts use lay counsel to represent indigent defendants so long as they

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

870 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fortin, supra note 28, at 100.
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are licensed to practice in tribal court.145 TLOA added a provision that
requires tribes to grant defendants the right to effective assistance of
counsel “at least equivalent to that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”146
Also under TLOA, “if the defendant is indigent, an ‘attorney,’ licensed by a
jurisdiction whose standards ensure ‘competence and professional
responsibility,’ must be provided at the tribe's expense.”147 Consequently, if
the tribe adopts the enhanced sentencing of TLOA, then they must also
adopt the guarantees of effective assistance by a licensed attorney.148 While
the provision is not specific as to what constitutes effective assistance,
courts will likely follow the constitutional standard for effective
assistance.149 The defendant’s prior tribal conviction in Long was not
governed by the new provisions of the TLOA.150 Thus, lay counsel was
allowed to represent the defendant in tribal court.
The TLOA provision regarding effective assistance is seen by some as
further assimilating tribes into Western legal culture and that lay counsel
may actually be better trained in tribal common law and understandings of
tribal legal culture than licensed attorneys.151 Further, many tribes are not
able to incorporate TLOA because of the cost of maintaining full defense
counsel for indigent defendants.152 Given that not all tribes have adopted
TLOA, many tribes likely have convictions similar to the prior conviction
in Long. Thus, Long illustrates the potential use of prior lay counseled tribal
convictions in subsequent proceedings for tribes not under TLOA.
C. When Right to Counsel Attaches
Because of dual sovereignty, tribal courts and federal courts can bring
the same or similar charge in both jurisdictions, but the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel will only attach in federal court. In United
States v. Mahkimetas, the defendant was arraigned in tribal court.153 As
mentioned previously, if this case was brought in federal jurisdiction, the
right to counsel would attach at the defendant’s arraignment. During a tribal
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 100.
TRIBAL LAW & POLICY INST., TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE: TRIBAL LAWS
IMPLEMENTING TLOA ENHANCED SENTENCING AND VAWA ENHANCED JURISDICTION 71
(2016).
150. United States v. Long, 870 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2017).
151. Fortin, supra note 28, at 100–01.
152. Id. at 97–99.
153. No. 17-CR-224, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57887, at *12 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 4, 2018).
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investigation following the tribal court arraignment, the defendant asked to
invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.154 The investigators stopped
their questioning, but later a federal district court picked up the case and the
same investigators again initiated questioning during travel to the federal
court arraignment.155 The defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was invoked when he asked for counsel following the tribal court
arraignment.156 Thus, his rights were violated when the investigators
initiated questioning without counsel present because he had invoked the
right after the tribal court arraignment.157
The Seventh Circuit held that there was not a Sixth Amendment
violation partially because of Bryant’s holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not apply in tribal courts.158 Thus, the right to counsel
did not attach at a tribal court proceeding because the tribal code did not
offer the defendant the right to appointed counsel, and the defendant did not
make any indication that he was going to hire counsel at his own
expense.159 The court reasoned that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel would only attach after the federal court arraignment.160
Given that federal courts and tribal courts are separate sovereigns and the
defendant can be charged for the same crime in both court systems, the time
in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches is difficult for
defendants to understand. This case provides notice to tribes to caution and
inform defendants of the difference in laws from tribal court to federal
courts. Many defendants likely do not understand rules that are applicable
to the federal court system through the Constitution are not necessarily
applicable to tribes. Further, defendants need to be informed that rights
invoked in tribal court will not follow them into federal court, even if it is
the same or a similar charge.
D. Fifth Amendment Due Process Guarantee
The Supreme Court touched on the Fifth Amendment due process right
in Bryant, concluding that tribal court convictions do not inherently violate
due process rights because ICRA still guarantees the defendant these rights.
The federal district of South Dakota similarly applied this rule in United
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *14.
Id.
Id.
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States v. Gillette.161 The defendant in Gillette argued that his guilty plea in
tribal court was a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process right.162
The defendant argued that the court did not establish a factual basis for his
admission of guilt and the court did not inform the defendant of the charge
in court before pleading guilty.163 The South Dakota court used the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant to reason that ICRA, not the Fifth
Amendment, governs tribal court.164 The provisions of ICRA guarantee
defendants the due process of law.165 Courts are silent as to whether this
due process guarantee should be interpreted the same as the constitutional
guarantee.166
As to the factual basis claim, the court reasoned due process does not
require the finding of a factual basis.167 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 requires the finding of a factual basis for a guilty plea.168 Since ICRA
only incorporates a due process rule and does not incorporate the federal
rules, there was no requirement for a finding of a factual basis for guilt. 169
Further, the defendant claimed that he was not read his charge in court
before pleading guilty, but the court found that there was a trial transcript of
the defendant’s attorney reading the charge to the defendant before the plea
was given.170 Thus, the defendant’s ICRA due process right was not
violated.
The South Dakota court did not decide whether the due process right of
ICRA should be interpreted in the same way as the Fifth Amendment
right.171 While there cannot be a Fifth Amendment violation made in tribal
court, courts interpret due process violations using Fifth Amendment court
opinions because of the similarity of the ICRA guarantee.172 It cannot be
assumed that “in the limited circumstances in which federal courts now
apply [ICRA], the guarantees of [ICRA] will be enforced in exactly the
same way as their counterparts in the Constitution.”173 While the Fifth
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

No. 3:17-CR-30122-RAL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47968 (D.S.D. Mar. 23, 2018).
Id. at *11–12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *14–15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *14–15.
Id.
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 414 (6th ed. 2014).
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Amendment due process of law is not applied to the tribes, a federal court
could use Fifth Amendment precedent to make its decision because of its
similarities with the due process guarantee of ICRA and the court’s
familiarity with constitutional due process. While the court in Gillette
explicitly stated that it did not make a decision on whether to apply the due
process clause of ICRA in the same manner as the Fifth Amendment, its
analysis of the defendant’s claim that the court did not give him notice of
his charges was analyzed with Fifth Amendment due process precedent
cases.174 Gillette is an example of a court using constitutional case
precedent to interpret a constitutionally similar ICRA provision.
V. Implications
As the above cases illustrate, there are various ways in which courts have
applied the Bryant decision. All of the cases mentioned above limit the
rights of the defendant. While the rights of tribal defendants are more
limited than the rights given to federal or state court defendants under the
Constitution, the somewhat more limited guarantees of ICRA must be
upheld because tribes are sovereign. While the doctrine of comity allows
for courts to interpret the reliability of other sovereign’s convictions, Bryant
supports the idea that upholding tribal court decisions is more important.
The Bryant decision did not question ICRA’s law or its guarantees of
rights, but rather applied ICRA to the tribal case and did not entertain the
idea that the conviction could be reopened and argued. While potentially
limiting the rights of indigent defendants, ICRA is the guideline for what
tribal courts must offer tribal court defendants. Thus, any ICRA-governed
valid tribal court conviction will be upheld in a Constitution-governed U.S.
system.
A. Funding for Tribal Courts and the Implementation of the Tribal Law and
Order Act
The reason that ICRA does not guarantee defendants the right to counsel
equivalent to the Constitution is predominantly due to funding.175 As
mentioned previously, many tribes use lay counsel because retaining full
defense counsel is expensive. Moreover, many tribes have not implemented
TLOA primarily because of the lack of funding to provide counsel to
indigent defendants.176 Resources for tribes is a top concern.177 At a recent
174. Gillette, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47968.
175. Fortin, supra note 28, at 99.
176. Id.
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roundtable before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, funding was
repeatedly mentioned as the primary hindrance for tribes trying to
implement TLOA.178 One participant of the roundtable lamented that “[the
Tribal Law and Order Act] failed to introduce the financial resources to
become effective . . .” and that “[the tribe] need[s] additional, recurring
funding [to provide more defense counsel].” Another participant pointed
out that “[t]here is not as much money for indigent [defense] as there is for
prosecution.”179 With the lack of funding, many tribes cannot afford to
implement TLOA’s additional rights to indigent defendants. Thus, many
indigent defendants are still not offered assistance of counsel even when
subject to imprisonment.
Although funding is an issue, the implementation of TLOA is a positive
resolution to sovereignty issues. TLOA gives tribes the ability to stop
relying on the federal government to punish recidivism and it provides
guidelines for communication between the federal government and tribes.
As mentioned previously, if tribes implement TLOA, they are able to
punish Indian defendants for more than a year imprisonment. Consequently,
TLOA allows tribal courts to enhance punishment on repeat offenders in
tribal courts, rather than relying on federal courts and § 117(a) to prevent
recidivism. Thus, tribes that have implemented TLOA can use their own
resources to combat recidivism instead of relying on the federal system.
The federal government can be selective when deciding which tribal cases
to bring into the federal court system. Having the ability to punish domestic
assault repeat offenders with harsher punishment allows tribes to retain
more autonomy and ensure justice has been carried out in a way consistent
with the traditions of the tribe. Beyond the ability to sentence repeat
offenders in tribal court, TLOA also established guidelines for improved
communication between tribes and the United States Attorney’s Office.
This is meant to ensure that tribal cases are not being overlooked in federal
court. This open communication policy helps tribes influence the conviction
and punishment of Indian defendants in federal court. Thus, the
implementation of TLOA is beneficial to tribal autonomy, whether the
Indian defendant is being tried in federal court under § 117(a) or tribal
court.

177. See The Tribal Law and Order Act Five Years Later: Next Steps to Improving
Justice Systems in Indian Communities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
114th Cong. 9–34 (2016).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Through the adoption of TLOA, Indian indigent defendants are
guaranteed more rights than under the previous ICRA provisions. Although
tribes are adopting the TLOA into their respective criminal codes, funding
keeps many still relying on federal courts to punish recidivism for domestic
violence. The problem of domestic violence towards Indian women has
been the focus of many statutes, but tribes are not able to implement them
because of the lack of funding. While there are many resources available to
help tribes implement TLOA, there should be additional resources for
Indian indigent defendants to understand how their tribal court conviction
can be upheld outside of tribal jurisdiction.
B. The Violence Against Women Act’s Expansion of Jurisdiction to NonIndians
TLOA works with the Violence Against Women Act to deter and punish
domestic assault on Indian women. Indian women experience the highest
rates of domestic violence in the United States and the majority of domestic
violence offenses in Indian Country are committed by non-Indians.180
Under Title IX of the 2013 Violence Against Women Act, tribal courts
have jurisdiction of non-Indian perpetrators that do harm to Indian
victims.181 Unlike Indian defendants, a non-Indian indigent defendant being
tried in tribal court is entitled to bar-licensed court-appointed counsel if the
defendant is exposed to a term of incarceration at any length.182 This
“exposed to” rule is different from the Sixth Amendment because
defendants are granted assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
only if they are subject to actual incarceration, not merely “exposed to” a
possibility of incarceration.183
Many bills have been introduced since the creation of the Violence
Against Women Act to expand the types of violent crimes committed by
non-Indian defendants that fall into tribal court jurisdiction, but all have yet
to pass.184 Expanding jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants for the
purposes of deterring violence against Indian women will allow the tribal
courts to control who gets punished for crimes in Indian Country without
relying on the federal court system.
180. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016).
181. Jordan Gross, VAWA 2013's Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court
Proceedings—A Rising Tide That Lifts All Boats or a Procedural Windfall for Non-Indian
Defendants?, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 379, 420 (2016).
182. Id. at 381–82.
183. Id. at 382.
184. See H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. (2018).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/5

No. 1]

NOTES

139

The Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act
allow tribal courts to keep punishment within their jurisdiction rather than
relying on the federal courts to punish crimes that strongly affect tribes.
Tribes are able to take a strong approach toward the violence committed
against Native women from both Indians and non-Indians. These two
approaches differ in that the Indian indigent defendant is not guaranteed the
same right to counsel as the non-Indian indigent defendant. As tribes and
the federal government continue to work together to deter and punish
domestic violence habitual offenders in Indian Country, the rights of the
Indian indigent defendants need to be explained and understood by tribal
court defense attorneys and advocates who seek to prevent injustice toward
Indian defendants.
Conclusion
The differences between ICRA and constitutional provisions such as the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the usage of ICRA governed tribal
court convictions to enhance punishment, exhibit the unique sovereignty
issues of the tribal courts. The decision in United States v. Bryant upheld
the sovereignty of tribal courts and their ability to continue to use ICRA to
convict Indian defendants. Additionally, this decision was applied in state
and federal courts to uphold tribal court convictions and rules. For example,
tribal court convictions and rules apply for sex offender registration, the
assistance of lay counsel, when right to counsel attaches, and Fifth
Amendment due process rights. The potential implications from the
decision in United States v. Bryant include: the doctrine of comity; funding
needed to implement TLOA in order to keep enhanced punishment
sentencing within the discretion of the tribal courts; the protections afforded
to non-Indian defendants under the Violence Against Women Act; and the
charge to tribal courts to be cautious with indigent Indian defendants and
potentially create more resources for Indian defendants to get more
information on their rights inside and outside of tribal jurisdiction. While
upholding tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indian women, United States
v. Bryant demonstrates the lack of protection for Indian indigent defendants
in tribal court and tribes’ lack of control over punishment of domestic
assault habitual offenders. Tribal courts must both protect Indian women
and safeguard essential rights for Indian indigent defendants. While
seemingly in opposition, tribes have a great duty to protect all of their
citizens, therefore, they are tasked with protecting both of these rights.
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